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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STi\.TE OF UTAH 
UlHTEP AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, and ZIONS 
F.mST NATIONAL BANK, National Asso-
ciatwn, a corportion, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
GARY J. WILLEY ar.d JEAN M. WILLEY, 
li'S w1 fe, HORIZON INVESTMENT COR-
F ORATION, a corporation; OAK HILLS 
RECREATION CLUB, a corporation; WEST-
ERN STATES INVESTMENT, INC., a cor-
poration; WESTERN STATES TITLE IN-
SURANCE COMPANY, a corporation; 
TC•WNE APTS., a partnership; INTER-
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPORATION, a 
COFPORATION; WILLIAM MARCUS; 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRIGERATION, 
INC._: HOLBROOK COMPANY; UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION; IDEAL ELEC-
TRIC COMPANY: NATIONAL SURETY 
CORPORATION: OLYMPIA SALES COM-
PANY; UTAH CONCRETE PIPE COM-
PANY; FEDERAL BUILDING AND LOAN; 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL; THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA; R. W. TAYLOR 
STEEL C 0 MP ANY; LUCY STACY; 
CHARLESWORTH PLUMBING & HEAT-
ING CO.; and DOHRMANN COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
11086 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action commenced by United American 
Lifr Insurance Company and Zions First National 
1 
Bank to foreclose thei:. mterest in various parcels of 
real estate owned by the defendants and being located 
in Ogden, Utah. This appeal is concocr.ed only with · 
that 29 acre parcel of real estate on which the Oak Hilli · 
Country Club was built, the description being set forth 
in the plaintiff's Complaint as the First Cause of Action. 
The appeal is based upon the defendant's amended 
Counter-Claim that the amount of interest charged for 
the loan was usurious, which would also affect the 
amount which the plaintiff should have obtained on its 
First Cause of Action. The remaining Causes of Action 
were based on promissory notes of the defendant which , 
were secured by separate parcels of property. While i 
the funds were obtained for the Cluli's operation, the 
amounts are not in dispute here and are not a basis 
for this appeal. There is aiso no question iaiseu as to 
the priority of the creditors mvolved. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found, without trial, that plaintitf ! 
was entitled to relief as prayed and granted summary 
judgment on the basis of the pleadings on file, and the 
deposition of Gary J. Willey. The court further denied 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis 
of the amended counter-claim and dismissed the same 
with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of tpe plaintiff's 
2 
summary judgment, a remand for trial on the question 
of usury on appellants' amended counter-claim, and 
an order of the court extending appellants' redemption 
rights until a six month period after a final determi-
nation of this litigation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this brief where the word defendant or defend-
i1Bts are used, it refers to the respective interests of 
, Gary J. Willey, Jean M. Willey, Horizon Investment 
1 
Corporation and Oak Hills Recreation Club. 
The facts as set forth on file and particularly in 
the deposition of defendant Gary J. Willey were basic-
ally undisputed. The defendants developed a large 
country club complex near the mouth of Ogden Canyon 
across from the existing El Monte Golf Course. In 
the course of construction the defendant, Gary J. Wil-
, ley, put approximately $160,000.00 of his own funds 
into the project (supported by R. 28 p. 7, 11, 64). The 
i defendants had obtained several loans for construction 
of the improvements from Zions First National Bank 
ll'ith the amount of $270,000.00 having been obtained 
In September, 1964 (R.28 p. 13). In December, 1964, 
it was determined that additional funds were required 
for the completion of the country club improvements, 
so Gary J. Willey approached a Mr. Campbell, who 
in turn worked with a Mr. Noble in obtaining a loan 
irJm the plaintiff, United American Life Insurance 
Company in the sum of $450,000.00. Campbell and 
3 
Noble worked for various individual borrowers in ar. 
ranging loans for United American, and also worked 
for United American in obtaining borrowers and com. 
pleting the insurance company's transactions. ~Ir. 
Campbell, Mr. Noble (a former employee of the Urnted 
American Life Insurance Company, (R.28 p. 11) Mr. 
Borger, Secretary Treasurer of the Insurance Com-
pany, and the defendant, Gary J. Willey, met a11d 
worked out the details for the loan (R.28 p. 15, 16, 17, 
18.) Mr. Noble personally brought the commitment to 
Zions in behalf of United American (R. 28 p. 17, 18), 
based on the fund~ to United American and paid paid 
Campbell $13,000.00 and Noble $9,000.00 by cashier·s 
checks. (R.28, p. 21, 22). 
The loan with United American was not to take 
effect for one year with Zions First National llank 
providing the funds in the sum of $450,000.00 for the 
interim period. At the expiration of the one year period, 
the agreement provided that United American would 
pay the $450,000.00 to Zions. From the loan of $450,-
000.00 made in December, 1964, $270,000.00 was ap-
plied to the original loan (R.28 p. 20), leaving $180,-
000.00; $70,000.00 was retained by Zions to secure 
leased equipment (said equipment being those same 
items foreclosed pursuant to paragraph 3 of the plain-
tiffs' First Cause of Action and marked as plaintiffs' 
Exhibit ''C" (R. 28 p. 2~), leaving $110,000.00; 
$!),000.00 was paid . dirc::Gtly to United American Life 
Insurance for the_ def~ndapt by Zions First National 
Bank for making the loan (R. 28 p. 21, 49, 50), $45,-
4 
000.00 additional and at the same time was paid to 
United, but rather than Zions paying it directly, it was 
paid to defendant, Gary J. 'Villey, who in turn paid 
1t to United American (R.28, p. 19, 20, 47}, leaving 
~.'iti,000.00. Concurrently $22,000.00 was paid to Bro-
kers Noble and Campbell (R.28 p. 21, 22} leaving 
~34,000.00 which was available for the defendants to 
disburse to creditors. 
The defendants at no time had the use of the 
$.14,000.00 which was paid to the plaintiff, United 
American Life Insurance Co. The agreement between 
defendants and plaintiff, United American Life In-
surance Company was that in the event other financing 
could have been obtained within one year, then the 
$45,000.00 would have been returned to the defendants 
(R.28 p. 45). Zions First National Bank was unaware 
of the additional $45,000.00 payment imposed upon 
the defendant (R.28 p. 47}. The loan was taken and 
paid by United American Life Insurance Company 
in December, 1965 (R. 1, p. 3, 4 and Exhibit "A") at 
which time interest up-to-date in the sum of $20,857.47 
was paid by the defendant to Zions on a note, secured 
by a first mortgage on a separate parcel of real estate 
lR.28, p. 26 reads $20,000). 
The terms of the ten year trust deed note ( R. l 
Exhibit "A") required quarterly payments of principal 
in the sum of $11,250.00, plus interest, the first payment 
bcine- due on or before March 15, 1966. No payments 
were made by the defendant (R.28 p. 25, 26). 
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In .March, 1966, the operation Df the Club f acilitie~ ! 
was leased to vVestern States Investment Company ; 
(R,28, p. 32, 33). Because the Company was delinquent 
in payments on the lease ( R. 28, p. 33), legal action was 
taken against Western (R.28, p. 35). However, a 
determination was not made by the court since as a · 
practical matter the Club was closed on approximate]\· 
September 20, 1966, because utilities were unavailable 
based upon non-payment of the utility bills by \Vestern. 
A further reason for non-determination was that the : 
State of Utah had instituted a suit earlier in the Dis- ' 
trict Court and had the Court's order not been complied 
with by October 1, 1965, the State on the basis of non· 
compliance witht he order, would have closed the club 
(R.28 p. 40). 
Un_ited American Life Insurance Company cQm· 
menced this action on October 17, 1966, took over 
physical control of the Club without opposition from 
the defendant or the appointment of a receiver, and has 
operated it since that time. Pursuant to the Trust Deed 
Note's acceleration clau~e, the entire balance was de-
clared due and owing. in_ the sum of $450,000.00, with 
interest at 8% per annum from December 15, 1965, 
amounting to the sum of $9,000.00 as of March 14, 
1966 (R.l, p. 5). 
G nited American continued to have Wes tern ln-
ve1)tment, or its _successor, operate it until sometime in 
the $ummer of 1967, when Orl:;md Finadaca took over 
the management. 
6 
.Mr. Fiandaca later entered into a purchase agree-
ment to purchase the Club and acreage for in excess 
nf $600,000.00 (R. 39). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
I. The District Court erred in granting summary 
1 Judgment to plaintiff and dismissing defendants' coun-
ter-claim as to the question of usury. 
The sections of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, which govern interest rates and usury and 
which are applicable to the present factual situation are 
as follows: 
15-1-2 "The parties to any contract may agree 
in writing for the payment of interest for the 
loan or forbearance of any money, goods or 
things in action, not to exceed ten per cent per 
annum; 
(a) That a loan or any renewal thereof ex-
cept a loan made under subsection (g) may spe-
cifically provide for a service charge, which shall 
not exceed four percent of the principal sum of 
said loan; such service charge shall not be sub-
ject to any additional charge or interest. 
15-1-4 "Any judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall 
be specified in the judgment; other judgments 
shall bear interest at the rate of eight per cent 
per annum. 
7 
1.5-1-7 "The. taking, receiving, reserving or 
charging of a . rate. of interest greater than is 
allowed by section 15-1-2, shall be deemed a.for-
feiture of the entire interest which the note, bill 
or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which 
has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the 
greater rate of interest has been paid, the person 
by whom it has been paid, or his legal represen-
tatives, may recover back three times the amount 
of the interest thus paid from the receiver or 
taker thereof and reasonable attorney fees, pro-
vided that such action is commenced within two 
years from the time the usurious transaction oc-
d
,, 
curre . 
The remedy of Summary Judgment has con-
fronted the Utah Supreme Court on numerous occa-
sions. Rule 56 ( c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets 
the standard for the determination providing that sum· 
mary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, de-
positions and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits,. if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any· material fact and that the moving party is ·entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." The test then is not 
whether the moving party would prevail on the merits 
at trial but only whether there are any genuine issues 
as to material fact for the jury's determination. 
Section 1235 of Barron and Holtzoff points out 
that it is the burden of the party moving for summary 
judgment to clearly demonstrate that there is no gen· 
uine issue of fact. In this regard, it is pointed out that 
any doubt as to whether or not a genuine issue exists 
should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the 
8 
summary judgment. Once the moving party has shown 
that if the case goes to trial there will be no competent 
evidence to support a finding for his opponent, it then 
becomes the burden of his opponent opposing the mo-
1 t1on to show that there is a genuine issue to be tried; 
he is not required to show that he will prevail at the 
trial on the merits. 
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with summary 
1udgments in a variety of factual situations and based 
upon these cases certain guidelines have been provided. 
These guidelines have been rather consistent irregard-
less of whether or not the case has been remanded to 
the District Court for trial. The primary consideration 
of the court has been based on the facts of the case and 
the applicable law. 
The guidelines as set forth m some of the more 
recent cases are as follows: 
Referring to the remedy of summary judgment in 
Pender v. Alix, 11 Utah 2d 58, 354 P2d I 066 ( 1960) , 
a real property action, Justice Crockett in his dissent 
commented: 
"It should be kept upper most in mind this is 
a review of a summary judgment; that it is a 
drastic remedy which deprives the party of the 
opportunity to present his evidence; and which 
the court therefore should be extremely reluctant 
lo grant. When it does so, the record must be 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the de-
feated party; and wherever the claim of the 
parties to fact are in dispute, it must be assumed 
9 
that his claims will be believed. This is so be-
cause . he should be turned out of court without 
a trial only when, in viewing the record as above 
stated, and all doubts resolved in his favor, he 
nevertheless would not be entitled to prevail." 
In Samms v Eccles, H Utah 2d 289, 358 P2d 344 1 
( 1961) an action in tort, the discussion of the court in 
remanding the case for trial is set out below: 
-"A motion for summary judgment is in effect 
-a-demurrer to the-daims of the plaintiff, saying: 
Assiiming they are true, no right to recovery is 
shown. It is regarded as a harsh measure which 
. the courts are reluctant to sanction because it 
deprives the· advers'e party Of an opportunity to 
present the evidence concerning the grievance 
for adjudication. For this reason, plaintiff's 
contentions must be considered in the light most 
to her advantage and all doubts resolved in favor 
of permitting her to go to trial; and only if when 
the whole matter is so viewed, she could, never· 
theless, establish no right to recovery, should the 
motion be granted." 
Tangren v. Pengalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P 2d 
179 ( 1961) was an action on a joint tenancy of two 
bank accounts. The court's discussion of Summary 
Judgment in remanding the case was as follows: 
-
"The sustaining of summary motions without 
affording the party an opportunity to present 
his evidence is a stringent measure. which courts 
should be reluctant to grant. It should be borne 
in mind that although disclosing of a case on 
.such a motion may seem an easy and expeditious 
method oLdealing with litigation, it may not in 
fact be so. Unless the court feels a high degree 
10 
of assurance that such ruling is correct, it may 
result in def eating that purpose and actually 
protracting the litigation by requiring an appeal 
and then having a trial which should have been 
had in the first place. Accordingly, the privilege 
of presenting evidence should be denied only 
when, taking the view most favorable to the 
party's claims, he could not in any event establish 
a right to redress under the law; and unless it 
clearly so appears, that doubt should be resolved 
in favor of permitting him to go to trial." 
The court in Christensen v. Financial Service 
Company, 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P 2d 1010 (1963), an 
action on a promissory note, wherein the court re-
manded the case for trial summed up its view on sum-
mary judgment as follows: 
"Summary judgment can properly be granted 
under Rule 56 ( c) only if the pleadings, deposi-
tions and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, which are offered, show with-
out dispute that the party is entitled to prevail. 
This condition is obviously not met if the alle-
gations of the plaintiff's complaint stand in op-
position to the averments to the affidavits so 
that there are controverted issues of fact, the 
determination of which is necessary to settle the 
rights of the parties. The trial judge correctly 
ruled that there were such issues of fact here." 
The following comments were made by this court 
in Kidnian v. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 318 P2d 898 
(1963), in a case involving an amount owing on a con-
ditional sales contract where again this court returned 
the inattcr to District Court for trial: 
11 
"In confronting the problem presented on this 
appeal we have been obliged to remain aware 
that a summary judgment, which turns a party 
out of coµrt without an opportunity to present 
his evidence, is a harsh measure that should be 
granted only when, taking the view most fav-
orable to a party's claims and any proof that 
1 
might properly be adduced thereunder, he could 
in no event prevail." 
Within the last year this court has continued to 
scrutinize summary judgments and their effect upon 1 
the rights of the defeated party. In the following cases, 
which were remanded to the District Court for trial the 
following statements were made: 
"Prior decisions pointed out that summary 
judgment is a drastic remedy and should be 
granted with reluctance. The plaintiffs should 
be granted the opportunity of producing what· 
ever evidence they wish, including circumstantial 
evidence." Housley v. Anaconda Company 19 
Utah 2d 124, 427 P2d 390 (1967). 
"It will be noted that a summary judgment 
can be granted only when it is shown that there 
is no genuine issue a.s to any material fact and 
that the moving party also is entitled to judg· 
ment as a matter of law under those facts. The 
court cannot consider the weight of testimony 
or the credibility of ~itnesses in considering a 
motion for summary judgment." Singleton v. 
Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P2d 126 
. (1~67). 
"Rule 56, U.R.C,P" should not be used where 
there arc issues of fact in dispute." Hatch v. 
Sugarhouse· Fiiiance Company, 434 P2d 758 
(1967). 
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"Whether we look at the record in a light 
more favorable to anybody, the test is whether 
there was such an issue, and we are constrained 
to, and hold that in this particular case there was 
such an issue of fact for presentation to an arbi-
ter of the facts." Russell v. Hooper Irrigation 
Co. 434 P2d 294 ( 1967) . 
Based upon the foregoing statements of thi~ court, 
the defendant submits that there are genuine issues of 
fact which should be determined at trial. These issues 
are developed in more detail but include, ( 1) whether 
the commissions paid to Noble . and Camp bell should 
be considered as interest, ( 2) whether the interest com-
putations should be based upon the face amount of the 
note or the amount received by the borrower, (3) 
whether the interest should be computed on a per an-
num basis, ( 4) whether there was a sale of credit, ( 5) 
what effect the one year interim period had on the 
loan, ( 6) whether a service charge was specifically des-
ignated and others. The remedy of summary judg-
ment in the instant case has been drastic for the de-
fendant and the benefactors who are the defendants' 
credits. The court should permit a trial to provide a 
full disclosure of all facts and then apply the law ac-
cordingly. 
As to the first question. of whether the $54,000.00 
discount added to interest as provided on the promis-
sory note exceeded the usury provisions, it has been de-
cided by almost all courts -that a note is to be tested for 
usury with reference to the actual sum received by the 
borrower and n~t face amount of note. 
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As pointed out in the statement of facts, the 
amount the defendant received was minimal in compar-
ison to the amount obligated for, and a maximum which 
the plaintiff could contend that was received by the 
defendant was $396,000.00. Plaintiff has never dis-
puted the fact that none of the $54,000,00 was applied 
to principal or to interest payments as provided in the 
note. 
National American Life Insurance Company v. 
Bayou Country Club, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 417, 403 P2d 
26 ( 1965) is a case which factually is very similar to 
the case at hand and discusses many of the same prob-
lems encountered in this litigation. The court in that 
case specifically set forth the Utah law on this ques-
tion in the following statement: 
"Whether interest in excess of the allowed 
rate is charged will be determined by the amount 
the borrower actually receives." 
That case footnotes Taylor v. Budd 217 Calif. 262, 
18 P2d 333, which holds: 
"A note is to be tested for usury with refer· 
ence to the actual sum received by the borrower, 
and not by the face amount of the note." 
These statements coincide with the law in general 
on the subject as set forth in 91 C.J.S. 35. 
"A contract or (Jbligation for the payment of 
a sum of money larger than that actually le?t 
to, or due from the debtor is usurious if the dif· 
f erence between the face amount of the obliga· 
tion and the sum actually received or owed by 
14 
the debtor, when added to the interest, if any, 
stipulated in the contract, exceeds the return 
permitted by law on the sum actually so received 
or due." . 
The plaintiff contends that the law should be 
otherwise ( R.30, computations). If such a contention · 
was followed to its conclusion, then the plaintiff sup~ 
posedly could have collected in advance up to $282,-
359.84) (based on plaintiff's computations) without 
riolating the usury laws. 
The conclusion likewise would preclude the eff ec-
tiveness of the usury laws since any lender could obtain 
any amount of interest based on the face of the note 
without regard to the amount the borrower actually 
received. 
The discount of $54,000.00, when addeq to the 
' sum of interest charged on the note based over a ten 
(10) year period, exceeds the amount allowed by the 
Usury Statute (R. 26). 
It should be further pointed out that the compu-
tations included a 4% service charge, however, U.C.A. 
15~1-2 (a) provides "That a loan or any renewal thereof 
may specifically provide for a service charge, which 
charge shall not exceed four percent of the principal 
sum of said loan, such service charge shall not . be sub-. 
Ject to any additional charge or .interest." · 
In the transaction in question, the promissory note 
I 
ur closiug documents did not specifically provide. for a . 
service charge and plaintiff cannot now say that .it can 
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make l)uch charge and not be included as an interest 
charge. 
The nearest semblance to any service charge, al-
though not specifically set forth, was defendants' state-
ment that $9,000.00 was paid in his behalf from Zions 
to United American as a loan fee ( R. 28, p 50). If 
this was determined to be the service charge, then the 
additional amount of $9,000.00 should be added to 
interest on the computations. 
Although the statute prohibits additional mterest 
on the amounts taken as a service charge, the plaintiffs 
in their computations have charged interest on this 
amount, which charge is also reflected in the $516,-
376.95 judgment as provided in the summary judgment 
granted to the plaintiff. 
In this area alone, there is certainly adequate dis· 
pute to disallow the summary judgment to plaintiff, 
and to permit defendants to prove by expert witnesses 
that the calculations as to interest exceed the maximum 
allowed by the Usury Statutes. 
Although the foregoing analysis has assumed that 
the interest rate should be based upon the full term of 
the note, there is an additional question of whether 
U.C.A. 15-1-12 should apply wherein it states "not to 
exceed 10 percent 'per annum.'" 
The following statement of this court in the Bayou 
case would indicate that the per annum basis should 
be used: 
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"Plaintiff at no time expected to receive the 
$14,500.00 as a discount over the period of fif-
teen years, but received the said sum in advance 
as a payment from the defendant, and as a bonus 
111 consideration for making the loan." 
In other jurisdictions, there is a diversity of opin-
ion as suggested in 57 ALR 660 §8. That particular 
section discusses the situation on some long-term loans 
bearing substantially less than the maximum interest if 
computed over the period of the loan, where addition~! 
interest payments are required to be paid concurrently 
with the interest provided in the note. 
In Virgil R. Coss Mortgage Co. v. Jordan, 167 
Ark. 34, 267 S.W. 590 (1924) involved a 10 year Iiote 
at 6%, but the 4% commission based on 10 years was 
to be paid within 4 years .. This was all treated as in-
terest on the loan, and inasmuch as the accelerated pay-
ment of the part of the interest designated as 4% "com~ 
mission" would make the rate of interest in excess of the 
legal maximum of 10%, the loan was usurious. 
In regard to the second question, whether the 
transaction was a sale of credit, and not a loan ol 
money, it is necessary to look only at the facts. The 
$9,000.00 which was remitted by Zions First National 
Bank to plaintiff was a discount of two percent (2%) 
of the loan commitment of $450,000.00 which was osten-
sibly for issuing the commitment. The $45,000.00 paid 
to plaintiff, United American, was to be held in the 
event that the plaintiff provided the permanent finan-
cing by the purchase of such loan from Zions First Na-
tional Bank. Plaintiff purchased said note in Decern· 
her, 1965, some ten (10) months after the original note 
was signed with Zions First National Bank, and in De-
cember, 1965, upon the purchase of said note, the $45,· 
000.00 was taken by plaintiff. The question therefore 
becomes whether due to the fact that Zions First Na· 
tional Bank was the intermediary lender for a period 
of ten ( 10) months, that plaintiff can receive $54,· 
000.00, which would be greater than the law allowed 
under the Usury Statutes: The courts have unani· 
mously agreed that no subterfuge used by a lender to 
avoid Usury Statutes will be allowed and the court will 
look to the substance of every transaction as to whether 
the lender received excessive interest. 
The Bayou case reflects the law of Utah wherein 
the Court states: 
"The plaintiff took the $14,500.00 as consid· 
eration for making the loan and said sum can 
only be considered as additional interest beca~se 
the sum was never credited to defendant as pr111· 
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cipal and the sum of $65,000.00 has been claimed 
by plaintiff at all times in these proceedings." 
"A court will look to the substance of every 
transaction as to which usury is pleaded, and if 
the lender is securing a greater benefit than that 
provided by law by any kind of a device, the con-
tract will be held usurious, although it is cloaked 
under the guise of a commission, bonus or other 
name." 'iVallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal 585, 245 P. 
964. See also Haines v. Commercial .Mortgage 
Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956 and 55 AM. Jur., 
Usury Section 14. 
"In testing for a usurious exaction, a fee or 
bonus beyond the legal rate of interest consti-
tutes an additional charge for interest." Haines 
v. Commercial Mortgage Co., Supra. See also 
Murphy v. Wilson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 132, 314 
P. 2d 507. 
The plaintiffs contend here, as was done in the 
Bayou case, that the $45,000.00 should be considered 
as a purchase for credit, a commission, a bonus or some-
thing else, but it there, as it should be here, was deter-
mined to be interest and any other guise, name or third 
party dealings do not change the characteristic of the 
agreement. The Court further stated: 
"Plaintiff at no time expected to receive the 
$H,500.00 as a discount over a period of 15 
years, but received the said sum in advance as a 
payme11t from the defendant and as a bonus in 
consideration of making the loan." 
In further reference to the allegation of plaintiffs 
that this was a sale of credit, Rossberg v. Holesapple, 
12:J Utah 54,4, 260 P2d 563, is cited. Although the claim · 
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there was that it was a sale of credit, the holding of the 
court was to the contrary, indicating that the court is 
very skeptical of what is termed a sale of credit when 
in fact it amounts to payment of interest. This case 
is footnoted in 91 C.J .S. 21, wherein it states: 
"These so-called loans of credit are so hkel) 1 
to be perverted to usurious purposes that they 
are viewed with great jealousy by the courts, and 
if it appears from all the circumstances of the 
case, that the parties intended a usurious loan, 
the court will hold the transaction unlawful. 
Plaintiff seems to rely a great deal on the fact 
that since they were not required to purchase the loan 
for a period of one ( 1 ) year and did not take the $45,. 
000.00 until they purchased the note, that the transac· 
tion could not be usury. However, it is the agreement 
to exact and pay usurious interest and not the perform· 
ance of the agreement which renders it usurious. 
As stated in the Bayou case: 
"The violation of the law resulted in the mak· 
ing of the agreement to exact and pay usurious 
interest and not in the performance of the agree· 
ment. The test to be applied in any case is 
whether there was an expressed intention to 
charge a rate of interest greater than is allowed 
by law, and this is determined as of the date of 
its inception." Citing Seebold v. Eustermann, 
216 Minn. 566, 13 N.\V. 2d 739, 152 A.L.R. 
585; Gaither v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 
26 U.S. 37, 7 L. Ed. 43. 
The fact is that United American did make the 1 
loan, did furnish the money required, did retain the 
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.~j~,000.00 prepayment and did bring this law suit upon 
that transaction. 
There are no basic differences in this case now be-
1ore the Court and the Bayou case, as in each instance 
,n Insurance Company is attempting, by divious 
means, to exact more money than the law allows. Re~ 
move the subterfuge, agreements, intermediary lender, 
and you find the exact situation exists in each case. If 
this type of scheme is allowed, then there is no control-
ling the unscrupulous lender, as in each situation they 
11ill use an intermediary to make the loan, guarantee 
same, collect their excess interest and then have the 
mtermediary lender assign the note back, and a void the 
usury statutes. 
The truth of the matter is that by a scheme and 
subterfuge the plaintiff exacted more money from de-
fendant than the law allows. The fact that defendant 
had opportunity of finding another lender to purchase 
the loan or to pay off the loan and recover back the 
h5,000.00 is not sufficient to take the transaction out 
of the Usury Statute due to the fact that plaintiff had 
knowledge of defendant's financial circumstances and 
due to the fact that the entire transaction must be con-
sidered as a whole to determine whether plaintiff's acts 
were merely a scheme and device to evade the Usury 
Statute. 
In plaintiff's memorandum ( R. 30, P. 89), plain-
tiff quotes 91 C.J.S., Usury Section 31 (c) for the 
propositior~ that since defendant had opportunity to 
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pay off $450,000.00 on or before plaintiff purchased 
note from Zions, that plaintiff now can take the $45,· 
000.00 as a penalty. The referenced cases in that sec. 
tion are not factually similar to the present case. One I 
reference case, Ford v. Washington National Buildmg \ 
and Loan Association 10 Idaho 30, 76 P. 1010, was a t 
loan over a ten year period. The beginning rate of in- 1 
terest amounted to 12.563 and at the end of seven years 1 
would exceed 363, with 183 per annum being the 
maximum allowed by law. The defendant argued that 
since the plaintiff could have paid the note prior to the 
expiration date, then there would not have been usur-
ious interest, and therefore, the usury statute should 
not apply. The court however rejected this argument 
stating as follows: 
"It cannot be presumed that the contract was 
executed with any view to payment in any other 
manner or at any different time than that stipu· 
lated therein. The contract shows on its face the 
intent of the parties thereto. The intent was to 
charge and collect, under devious and specious 
pretexts, what amounted to a higher rate of in· 
terest than that allowed by law. 
"To allow the purposes and objects of the 
usury statutes to be thwarted and the law evaded 
by a corporate plan so unique would be an ac· 
knowledgment of the inability of the courts to 
look through a veneer of words and find the real 
object and purpose soue-ht. It seems to me that 
the doctrine of estoppel which prevents a party 
from coming into court and seeking to have t~e 
court· place a different construction upon h:s 
contract from that which he has placed upon it 
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by his continuous actions and conduct, and there-· 
by prejudice the rights of the other contracting 
party, should not be applied to prevent the en-
forcement of the usury statute. · 
The $54,000.00 received by plaintiff was in fact 
take11 as an additional sum for making the loan. There 
1s no dispute that they received said sum, that there 
11as no credit ever given by way of reduction of princi- · 
pay, credit to interest, or otherwise, and def endarit 
· ihould be allowed to go to trial to show that said tran-
siction was a guise to evade the usury laws. 
The agreement between plaintiff and defendant as 
to the retention by plaintiff of the $45,000.00 has never 
1
1 
been made a part of the record. As stated previously 
m tl11s brief on summary judgment, defendant should 
have every opportunity, if there remains any question 
whatsoever, to proceed with evidence at a trial and in-
this regard there are ample facts present so that de-
fendant should be allowed to submit said questions and 
facts to a court or jury for disposition as to the question 
of usury. · 
If the decision were to the contrary, either as to 
sale of credit, the insertion of a period of time, or the 
use of ::m intermediary, it would substantially modify 
the effectiveness of the usury statute since any lender 
could neatly utilize the loophole provided. 
It should_ be _noted, that in the Bayou case, the 
amount for which plaintiff received judgment was the 
face amount of the note and any additional interest 
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charges were excluded since they were usurious. If tht 11
1 
interest was similarly found to be usurious here, then 1 il 
plaintiff should only be entitled to $450,000.00 rather 
than $516,376.95 as provided in the summary judgment 
in their favor. ! ti 
' u 
So that the amounts of the judgment may correct!) u 
be determined, the case should be remanded to the t( 
District Court for the extension of the redemptio11 
rights of the defendant six months after the final deter· 
a1 
mination of this litigation when the amount owed by the 
m 
defendant is finally determined. 
The plaintiff has been in physical control of thr 
premises since approximately October 1, 1966, and has 
continued to operate the Club since that time without 
interference from the defendants ( R. p. 39) . Althougl1 
they have had the beneficial use of the Club smce that 
time, they have nevertheless continued to charge defend· 
ant interest on entire loan (R. 33, p. 5). There is an 
agreement for the sale of the Country Club and acre· 
age, (R. p. 39) and the extension of the redemption 
period would appear to have little, if any, effect on the 
plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should 
only be granted with reluctance and when there are 
no issues of fact. This is not true in the case before this . 
court as the basic calculations using the amount of the 
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I loan received by the borrower would show that the 
i interest exceeded that allowed by the usury statute. 
Furthermore, there are adequate facts to indicate 
' that lhe use of an intermediary and agreements were 
uml only as a basic subterfuge to attempt to avoid the 
: usury laws of the State of Utah. In allowing such sub-
j tcrfuge this would nullify said usury laws. 
! 
Furthermore, there are sufficient questions of fact 
and law to remand to the district COtJrt for trial to deter-
mine the question of usury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
and 
CARL T. SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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